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Abstract This paper puts forward a formal proposal for a judge-dependent notion of
assertion that derives asymmetries in the discourse profile of subjective and objective
assertions while preserving a unary illocutionary profile for utterances of declarative
sentences. We propose that when a speaker asserts a sentence, they commit to that
sentence being true as judged by themself, but project acceptance of the truth of that
sentence as judged by all interlocutors. This account makes different predictions,
then, for assertions of declarative sentences with judge-invariant denotations, and
assertions of declarative sentences with judge-variant denotations.
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1 The challenge: the discourse profile of subjective assertions
Consider the following declarative sentences: (1a) describes a factual matter, whose
truth value is intuitively the same across speakers; (1b), by contrast, reports on a
subjective assessment, whose truth-value seems to crucially depend on the particular
perspective of the speaker.
(1) a. The movie was set in 1995. Objective
b. The movie was awesome. Subjective
Recent work has shown that these two types of moves differentially affect the
development of discourse (Beltrama 2018a,b); this asymmetry poses a challenge
to theories aiming at capturing the illocutionary profile of declarative sentences in
a unified way. In this paper, we solve this puzzle by proposing a judge-dependent
version of assertion, which derives the asymmetry while still assigning a single
illocutionary profile to declarative sentences.
The paper is divided as follows. In §3, we present the relevant observations.
In §4, we outline our proposal. In §5, we demonstrate the application of our
proposal to the problematic data. Finally, in §6, we discuss the potential of an
explanation of these asymmetries that eschews judge-dependence, or indeed any
semantic distinction between subjective and objective predicates.
* For discussion, thanks to Donka Farkas, Elsi Kaiser, Hazel Pearson, and audiences at Semantics and
Philosophy in Europe 10 and SALT 29. All errors are ours alone.
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2 Background: The theory of assertion
Much of semantic theory is concerned with the truth-conditional analysis of sentences
of natural language. A common assumption is that declarative sentences denote
propositions. Declarative sentences are often used in conversation to communicate
information—namely that the proposition they denote is true. But the theory of the
meanings of sentences is not (necessarily) the theory of how those meanings are
actually used, exchanged or negotiated in communication. To achieve this goal,
we need a theory of assertion—one that provides a mapping from the semantics of
declarative sentences to their communicative potential.1
We make the following assumptions about assertion. When a speaker s asserts a
sentence denoting p, they make a public discourse commitment to p (Hamblin 1971;
Gunlogson 2001), propose that p become common ground (Stalnaker 1978), and
make the question of whether p is true the current local Question Under Discussion
(QUD—Roberts 1996; Ginzburg 1996). We assume that this information is kept
track of on a ‘conversational scoreboard’ (Lewis 1979) in each participant’s head;
idealizing to a case in which there are no miscommunications or misunderstandings,
we will refer to a shared representation of the context as the scoreboard. For the sake
of concreteness, we will assume the scoreboard formalization of Farkas & Bruce
(2010), in which utterances place pairs of the syntactic structure and denotation of the
uttered sentence (or ISSUES) onto the QUD stack (or TABLE), thereby PROJECTING
a future state of the scoreboard in which that sentence has become common ground.2
Crucially, the view sketched in the above paragraph predicts a homogenous
discourse profile for assertions: for any assertion by a speaker s of a sentence
with syntactic structure S denoting p, the state of the scoreboard following the
assertion differs from the prior state of the scoreboard only in the following ways: s
is committed to p, ⟨S, p⟩ is on top of the Table, and a common ground incorporating
p is projected. An important corollary of this view, and in particular of models like
Farkas & Bruce (2010), is that any two moves that affect the scoreboard in the same
way should also exhibit a parallel behavior with respect to other discourse-related
phenomena—including the licensing of common ground update, provocation of
conversational crisis, and licensing of response particles. However, this prediction is
called into question by the examination of the behavior of subjective vs. objective
1 Approaches under the umbrella of dynamic semantics eschew static truth conditions and instead treat
context updates as the basic meanings of sentences of natural language (e.g. Kamp 1981; Heim 1982;
Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991; Veltman 1996). These approaches could be seen as packaging a theory
of assertion into the theory of natural language semantics. We set aside such theories here, opting to
keep the theory of assertion separate for clarity’s sake.
2 This final clause is a simplification, true only of declarative sentences. For interrogative sentences,
what is projected is a set of future states of the scoreboard in which some answer to the question has




3 The problem with subjective assertions
Beltrama (2018a,b) presents experimental studies highlighting three ways in which
subjective assertions differ from non-subjective assertions with respect to phenomena
that are supposed to be characteristic of all assertions. We briefly summarize the
observations here; the reader is referred to the original papers for details of the
methods and results of the experiments.
3.1 Automatic common ground update
Assertions are used to build common ground (Stalnaker 1978). An assertion pro-
poses a common ground update (Farkas & Bruce 2010), which is accepted by default
(Walker 1996).3 An account of assertion as licensing DEFAULT AGREEMENT pre-
dicts that any sentence should be taken to represent a mutual belief following an
uncontested assertion of it; if an interlocutor wishes to prevent this, they are obligated
to say so explicitly. Beltrama (2018a) tested this prediction by investigating sub-
jects’ intuitions about whether subjective sentences like (2a) and objective sentences
like (2b) represent mutual knowledge among the conversational participants if the
addressee does not respond overtly to their being asserted.
(2) a. The movie was awesome.
b. The movie was set in 1995.
Beltrama (2018a) found that subjective sentences were significantly less likely
to be judged to represent mutual knowledge than objective sentences following
an uncontested assertion (Beltrama 2018a: fig. 1). There is an asymmetry in
how strongly subjective and objective sentences trigger common ground update by
default.
3.2 Provocation of conversational crisis
Assertions raise the issue of whether the asserted proposition is true (Roberts 1996;
Ginzburg 1996), while also committing the speaker to the truth of the asserted
3 “Assertions project confirmation, and therefore the move of confirming an assertion is the least
marked next discourse move. . . . Note that assertion confirmation may be left unsignalled altogether.
This is, we claim, unsurprising given the default nature of the move, under the natural assumption
that the more canonical a move is the less overt marking it needs. . . . Denials are highly marked and
therefore they must be explicit and must be signalled . . . as early as possible.”
(Farkas & Bruce 2010: 93-100)
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proposition (Hamblin 1971; Gunlogson 2001). Crucially, if the addressee responds
with a denial, they have committed to the negation of that proposition; in this
particular situation, given the interlocutors’ contradictory commitments, it becomes
impossible to resolve the issue at hand. This state is called CONVERSATIONAL
CRISIS (Farkas & Bruce 2010). Conversational crises can be ended by one of
the interlocutors retracting their commitment, or by the interlocutors “agreeing to
disagree,” and moving on to another issue, leaving the original one unresolved.
Beltrama (2018a) investigated the aftermath of disagreements over subjective
and objective sentences, and found an asymmetry in the preferred follow-up strategy.
Participants read dialogues containing either a subjective or an objective sentence,
in which the original speaker responds to disagreement by either welcoming the
alternative viewpoint (3a) or insisting on his own (3b).
(3) Greg: The movie was {awesome, set in 1995}.
Mary: No, it was not!
a. Aha, interesting to hear!
b. No way! That can’t be true!
Subjects rated welcoming responses to be significantly more acceptable following
subjective assertions than objective assertions, and vice versa for insisting responses
(Beltrama 2018a: fig. 2). This contrast indicates an asymmetry in how strongly
subjective and objective sentences provoke conversational crisis, suggesting that
denials targeting subjective assertions do not cause a crisis, or at the very least cause
a much milder one than the one induced by denials targeting objective assertions.
3.3 Licensing of response particles
A basic design consideration of Farkas & Bruce’s (2010) Table model is that it
predicts the availability of response particles on the basis of the current state of the
scoreboard. Because any assertion alters the scoreboard in the same way, it should
license the same response particles (modulo the polarity of the asserted proposition,
and the polarity of the response, q.v. Roelofsen & Farkas 2015). Beltrama (2018b)
shows that this is not the case for all response particles; specifically, he observes that
the use of totally as a stand alone confirmation fragment sounds considerably better
in response to subjective assertions than it does in response to objective ones.
(4) a. A: The movie was awesome.
B: Totally!




In addition, Beltrama (2018b) provides experimental evidence that, when used as
an epistemic, speaker-oriented level modifier, totally is rated as significantly more
acceptable when modifying subjective assertions than when modifying objective
ones (see also Irwin 2014 on this use of the modifier). The contrast is shown in the
examples below. To appreciate this empirical observation, it is essential to assume
that the two sentences are uttered without previous discussion around the issue.
(5) a. John’s new house is totally beautiful. >
b. John’s new house is totally large.
Taken together, these observations point to an asymmetry in how available totally
is as a response to subjective and objective sentences, as well as as a modifier of
assertions containing subjective vs. objective sentences.
3.4 Ramifications
To account for their divergent behavior, Beltrama (2018a,b) suggests that subjective
assertions affect the scoreboard in a different way from ordinary assertions: whereas
ordinary assertions commit a speaker s to a proposition p and project a common
ground incorporating that proposition, subjective assertions commit s to the truth
of p as judged by herself, and raise the issue of whether the addressee judges p to
be true as well, projecting both a common ground in which they do and a common
ground in which they don’t.4
This approach, though, comes with a disadvantage: by assigning separate dis-
course profiles to subjective vs. objective assertions, it marks a step back from
recent advances in our understanding of the mapping from clause type to discourse
update (Gunlogson 2001; Farkas & Roelofsen 2017; Rudin 2018)—and in particular
from analyses aiming at deriving the discourse effects of declarative sentences from
their semantic type (modulo intonational factors—q.v. the above authors plus Pier-
rehumbert & Hirschberg 1990; Bartels 1999; Truckenbrodt 2006; Westera 2017).
We might thus wonder whether giving up the clause-discourse mapping is really
necessitated by the observations encountered in this section. In the remainder of the
paper, we argue that it is not; it is indeed possible to explain these data while holding
on to the idea that the discourse effect of utterances of declarative sentences can be
modeled in a unified way. Specifically, we follow Beltrama (2018b) in making use
of judge dependence in our account of subjective assertions; however, by percolating
judge dependence throughout the Table model, we are able to derive the observed
asymmetries between subjective and objective sentences from a uniform mechanism
of assertion.
4 For another approach assigning a separate illocutionary profile to subjective assertions, see Déchaine,




This section outlines our proposal. We first put forward some assumptions about the
semantics of subjective predicates that we inherit from prior literature (§4.1). We
then present our proposed mechanism of assertion (§4.2).
4.1 The semantics of subjective predicates
Subjective predicates, such as predicates of personal taste (the flagship examples are
tasty and fun) license FAULTLESS DISAGREEMENT (Kölbel 2004): in (6), despite the
fact that A and B have (apparently) asserted p and ¬p respectively, it’s not intuitively
obvious that either of them is mistaken, or has said something false.5
(6) A: This coffee is tasty!
B: No it isn’t!
The possibility of faultless disagreement is problematic: if ¬p = W − p, as is com-
monly assumed, then one of these sentences must be true, and one must be false.
One influential solution to this problem has been to parameterize the interpretation
function to a contextually relevant judge j whose taste is at issue (Lasersohn 2005;
Stephenson 2007; Bylinina 2017; and many others).6 On this view, plausibly for A’s
utterance, j = A, and for B’s utterance, j = B, so the proposition that B is negating is
not the proposition that A asserted, making it no longer a logical consequence that
one of them has said something false. This proposal allows us to define a distinction
between subjective and objective sentences:7
(7) (NON)SUBJECTIVITY
a. A sentence S is subjective iff ∃ j, j′,⟦S⟧ j ≠ ⟦S⟧ j′
b. A sentence S is objective iff it is not subjective, i.e. ∀ j, j′,⟦S⟧ j = ⟦S⟧ j′
If any element of a sentence varies with the judge parameter (changing the parameter
changes the denotation of the sentence), we call it subjective; if the denotation of the
sentence is judge-invariant, we call it objective.
5 For an argument that disagreements like this are not actually faultless, see Stojanovic´ (2007).
6 For a generalization of this strategy to other constructions, see MacFarlane (2014) on parameterization
to contexts of assessment. Not all proposals about subjective predicates involve sensitivity to an
interpretation parameter.
7 For convenience, we assume a judge-dependent semantics in this paper. However, our account could
be formalized for any semantics of subjective expressions that allows for a sharp semantic delineation
between subjective and non-subjective sentences, e.g. Umbach’s (2016) EVALUATIVE vs. NON-
EVALUATIVE propositions, Kennedy & Willer’s (2016) COUNTERSTANCE CONTINGENT vs. NON-
CONTINGENT propositions, or Coppock’s (2017) DISCRETIONARY vs. OBJECTIVE propositions. It’s
less clear whether our reasoning could be extended to accounts that allow no such delineation, like
accounts relying on generic quantification (Anand 2009; Moltmann 2010; Pearson 2013).
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This semantics gets around the most urgent logical problem posed by faultless
disagreement: how it can be possible for interlocutors to disagree over the truth of a
sentence without either one saying something false. In order for the application of
this semantics to Beltrama’s asymmetries to be made concrete, this semantic solution
must be complemented by a corresponding modification of the theory of assertion.
We turn to this task, which comprises the core of our proposal, in the next section.
4.2 Introducing judge dependence to assertion
We begin by articulating the interrelated components of the Table model before
moving on to the introduction of judge dependence to an assertion operation couched
within the model. The Table model has five named components, though two (cs and
ps) are derived components defined in terms of the primitive components (DC, cg,
and T ). Any context K is represented in terms of these five components.
(8) COMPONENTS OF THE TABLE MODEL
a. INDIVIDUAL DISCOURSE COMMITMENTS (DC): For each interlocutor
i, i’s commitment state DCi is the set of all propositions that i is publicly
committed to; DC is the set {DCi : i is a current interlocutor }
b. COMMON GROUND (cg): The Common Ground cg is the set of all propo-
sitions the interlocutors take to be mutual commitments
c. CONTEXT SET (cs): The Context Set cs is the set of all worlds compatible
with the interlocutors’ mutual commitments (= ⋂cg)
d. TABLE (T ): The Table T is a push-down stack of pairs of a syntactic struc-
ture and its denotation ⟨S,⟦S⟧⟩, the maximal element of which (MAX(T ))
being what is currently at issue
e. PROJECTED SET (ps): The Projected Set ps illustrates the future Common
Ground that could result from the denotation of MAX(T ) (DEN(MAX(T )))
becoming a mutual commitment (= {cg + DEN(MAX(T ))})8
Note that, because cg represents mutual commitments, it is constrained in a princi-
pled way by DC:
(9) INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENTS CONSTRAIN COMMON GROUND:
cg ⊇ ⋂DC
8 This formulation is simplified to capture only the behavior of declarative sentences. For a version
that works with both declarative and interrogative sentences, see Farkas & Bruce (2010).
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The practical ramification of this constraint is that if the interlocutors’ individual
commitments are updated such that they all contain some proposition p, p is auto-
matically added to cg, in order to maintain the relationship indicated in (9), i.e. to
keep the common ground reflective of mutual commitments.
We turn now to articulating a judge-dependent mechanism for assertion. Farkas
& Bruce’s (2010) assertion operator is given below, with some notational changes:
(10) ASSERTION (Farkas & Bruce 2010 version): (q.v. F&B ex. 9)
ASSERT(S,sp,Ki) = Ko such that
a. DCsp,o = DCsp,i+⟦S⟧
b. To = Ti+ ⟨S,⟦S⟧⟩
c. pso = {cgo+⟦S⟧}
d. in all other respects, Ko = Ki
In words: When a speaker sp makes an assertion using a sentence S in an input
context Ki, they commit to its denotation, place its denotation and its syntactic
structure on the Table, and project a common ground incorporating its denotation.9
We propose two modifications to this assertion operation, incorporating the
judge parameter. The assertion operation given in (10) doesn’t make reference to
judge parameterization. We will show that the asymmetries observed in §3 can be
made to fall out from a single assertion operation that distributes judge dependence
asymmetrically among the different parts of the operation. The first modification
that we propose is that when a speaker makes an assertion using a sentence S,
they commit to the denotation of S as parameterized to themselves as judge (cf.
Stephenson’s 2007 judge-dependent norm of assertion).10
(11) DCsp,o = DCsp,i+⟦S⟧sp
The second modification that we propose is that when a speaker makes an assertion
using a sentence S, what they make at issue is whether S is true as parameterized to
all n of the interlocutors i, and they project it becoming common ground that it is.11.
(12) a. To = Ti+ ⟨S,⟦S⟧i1+...+in⟩
b. pso = {cgo+⟦S⟧i1+...+in}
9 Note that we overload the plus sign here, using it to represent both adding an element to a set, and
pushing an element onto a stack. We trust that no confusion will result.
10 Note that here and throughout, we suppress all parameters of interpretation other than the judge.
11 Cf. Stephenson’s (2007) concept of a context set as a set of world-time-judge triples with all
interlocutors as judge and Coppock’s (2017) proposal that utterances of subjective sentences are used
to coordinate on shared outlooks.
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Putting these pieces together, the judge-dependent notion of assertion that we propose
here works as follows:
(13) ASSERTION (final judge-dependent version):
ASSERT(S,sp,Ki) = Ko such that
a. DCsp,o = DCsp,i+⟦S⟧sp
b. To = Ti+ ⟨S,⟦S⟧i1+...+in⟩
c. pso = {cgo+⟦S⟧i1+...+in}
d. in all other respects, Ko = Ki
The final assumption we make is a crucial one about the nature of default agreement.
We propose that default agreement comprises an agreement to share the assertor’s
commitment with no parameter shifts.
(14) DEFAULT AGREEMENT (final judge-dependent version):
When a speaker sp makes an assertion using a sentence S, thereby committing
themselves to ⟦S⟧sp, all interlocutors are by default taken to share their
commitment to ⟦S⟧sp.
That is to say, when a speaker makes an assertion using S, the addressee ad by
default agrees to share their commitment to ⟦S⟧sp—if ad wants to avoid sharing this
commitment, they must make some overt indication of that. However, there is no
default assumption that the addressee agrees to commit to ⟦S⟧ad .
In the following section, we show how the judge-dependent implementation
of assertion in (13), in combination with the judge-dependent implementation of
default agreement in (14), derives the asymmetries observed in §3.
5 Accounting for the facts
In this section, we show how the proposal from the previous section derives the
asymmetries observed in §3. We begin by showing how our modified, judge-
dependent implementations of assertion (13) and default agreement (14) derive
identical results to the more familiar implementation from Farkas & Bruce (2010)
when applied to objective sentences.
5.1 Objective assertions
Recall that a sentence is OBJECTIVE iff its denotation is judge-invariant (7b). Call
the proposition denoted by a given objective sentence, irrespective of the judge
parameter, p. In this case, the proposition that the speaker commits to by virtue
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of their assertion, and the proposition that they place on the Table and project the
common grounding of, are one and the same: p.
An important corollary of this discourse effect is that, in the case of an objective
assertion, default agreement will lead automatically to the projected common ground
becoming actual. To see this, consider that default agreement will commit the
addressee(s) to p as well (14). After this has happened, all interlocutors will share
a commitment to p. This means p will be automatically added to cg to reflect that
it is a mutual commitment, by (9). The speaker’s assertion projected a cg with p
added to it, and this is what has come about. In other words, in the case of objective
assertions, default agreement entails the default realization of the projected common
ground.
What happens if an addressee responds with disagreement? In the case that the
addressee responds to an assertion using S by making an assertion using its negated
counterpart ¬S, the addressee is now committed to ¬p, leading the conversation to a
state of crisis.12 We will define a conversational crisis as follows:
(15) CONVERSATIONAL CRISIS:
A conversation is in crisis iff DEN(MAX(T )) ∩ ⋂⋃DC = ∅13
In the Table model, an Issue is RESOLVED iff its denotation is entailed by the context
set. A conversation is in crisis if the current Issue is UNRESOLVABLE WITHOUT
RETRACTION: the participants have made commitments that block the restriction of
the context set to a subset of the denotation of the current Issue. If i1 is committed to
p, and i2 is committed to ¬p, and the denotation of the current Issue is p (or ¬p),
then the issue is unresolvable without retraction: any context set that is a subset of p
is ruled out by i2’s commitment, and any context set that is a subset of ¬p is ruled
out by i1’s commitment. Note, however, that this case of conversational crisis has
another property, which was not discussed in earlier accounts of this phenomenon.
We’ll call this property SEVERITY:
(16) SEVERE CONVERSATIONAL CRISIS:
A conversational crisis is SEVERE iff ⋂⋃DC = ∅.
In a severe conversational crisis, the interlocutors’ commitments are UNSHAREABLE:
they don’t just make resolution of the current Issue impossible, but they directly
12 This distinction between ¬S and ¬p is not as trivial as it seems! Because S is assumed here to be
judge-invariant, its negation will express the contradictory proposition to its positive-polarity form,
regardless of the assertor. But if S were subjective, nothing would guarantee that S as judged by i1
and ¬S as judged by i2 would denote contradictory propositions.
13 A note on this formula: first we aggregate all propositions that any interlocutor is committed to
(⋃DC), and then intersect all of those propositions to derive a set-of-worlds representation of the
total information carried by all of the interlocutors’ commitments (⋂⋃DC).
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contradict each other. In other words, not only is the current Issue unresolvable,
but it is not possible for the interlocutors to coherently agree to share each other’s
commitments. As we now turn to show, the distinction between severe and non-
severe conversational crises can shed light on the different behavior of objective vs.
subjective assertions. More precisely, disagreements in which one party asserts S
and the other asserts ¬S create severe conversational crises only if S is objective.
Because objective sentences are judge-invariant, our modifications to assertion
and default agreement have no effect on objective assertions: default agreement
actualizes the projected common ground, and severe conversational crises result
from disagreements. We now turn to showing that these properties do not hold
of subjective assertions. In particular, we’ll show that for such assertions such
disagreements still create conversational crises, but do not create severe ones.
5.2 No automatic common ground update for subjective assertions
In the case of a subjective assertion, the proposition that the speaker commits to
and the proposition that the speaker places on the Table and projects are different.
Because default agreement is with the proposition the speaker has committed to, this
means that default agreement won’t lead to actualization of the projected common
ground, thus explaining the different behaviors of this type of assertion with respect
to default updates.
Call the proposition that a speaker i1 commits to p (= ⟦S⟧i1), and the proposition
that the speaker projects the common grounding of q (= ⟦S⟧i1+...+in). By the definition
of subjectivity (7a), p is not necessarily equivalent to q. By default agreement, the
addressee(s) share the speaker’s commitment to p. By (9), this means p will be
automatically added to cg to reflect that it is a mutual commitment. But what is
added to the common ground here is the proposition denoted by the subjective
sentence as judged by the speaker, not as judged by the addressee(s), or as mutually
judged by all interlocutors. The resulting context set does not necessarily resolve
the Issue that the speaker raised—without the addressee(s) weighing in on whether
the sentence is true in their own judgment, the Issue that the speaker raised remains
unresolved, despite the fact that the context now reflects a shared commitment to its
truth in the speaker’s judgment.
There are two points that it is important to make here. The first is that this
account captures the intuition that assertions of subjective sentences raise the issue
of whether they are true in the judgment of the addressee. This intuition is directly
hardwired in Beltrama’s (2018b) special subjective assertion mechanism; here,
by contrast, it is derived from a general mechanism for assertion. In the case of
subjective assertions, default agreement does not resolve the Issue that has been
raised, and what is necessary to resolve it is information about the addressee’s
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judgment, but neither fact is hard-coded into a mechanism of assertion specific to
subjective sentences.
The second point is that common ground has increased, despite the fact that the
Issue the speaker has raised has not been resolved: the interlocutors now all share a
commitment to the denotation of the subjective sentence as judged by the speaker,
which is reflected in the common ground.14 Whereas the Issue raised by an objective
assertion is resolved by default agreement, the Issue raised by a subjective sentence
can only be resolved by an overt agreement response.
(17) A: This coffee is disgusting.
B: Yes, it is.
We assume that B’s response above amounts to an assertion of the same sentence
S as A’s initial assertion: we assume that yes simply encodes features that relate
the polarity of the prejacent to the polarity of its discourse antecedent (Roelofsen
& Farkas 2015), that it is anaphoric to this coffee, and that A’s utterance provides
the antecedent for the verb phrase ellipsis in B’s. B responding to A’s assertion
of a subjective sentence S by asserting S themself raises the same Issue as A’s
assertion, and projects the same common ground, but introduces a new commitment.
In addition to the proposition ⟦S⟧A that they committed to via default agreement in
response to A’s assertion, B is now also committed to ⟦S⟧B by virtue of her own
assertion. Via default agreement, A will share B’s new commitment, and they will
both be committed to both propositions. This means that both propositions are in
the common ground, and therefore that the information they carry is reflected in
the context set. Assuming that ⟦S⟧A ∧ ⟦S⟧B ↔ ⟦S⟧A+B, the context set now entails
DEN(MAX(T )), and the Issue raised by an assertion of S has been resolved. What
happens automatically for objective assertions must be achieved via overt agreement
with subjective assertions.
Precisely because, on our account, default agreement with subjective assertions
leads to a common ground update, we should now be explicit about what we take
the observations in §3.1 to indicate. Beltrama (2018a) observed that participants are
reluctant to assume that a subjective sentence represents mutual knowledge following
its assertion, if the addressee does not follow up with overt agreement. Note that
participants were asked about whether the sentence represented mutual knowledge.
We should distinguish, then, between a proposition being common ground, and a
sentence being common ground, seeing as subjective sentences determine different
propositions for different judges. We will say that a sentence S is common ground
14 Our ability to deliver this result is a reason to prefer our system over the one sketched by Stephenson
(2007), in which the context set is a set of world-time-judge triples that share all interlocutors as
judge. This framework cannot capture the way that subjective sentences can be used to coordinate on
worlds in which the interlocutors’ judgments differ!
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in a context c including n interlocutors i iff ⟦S⟧i1+...+in is entailed by the context set
in c. So when A asserts this coffee is disgusting to B in (17), the proposition ⟦This
coffee is disgusting⟧A becomes common ground by default, but the sentence itself
does not become common ground by default: it is only after B’s assertion that the
proposition ⟦This coffee is disgusting⟧B becomes a mutual commitment, rendering
the sentence common ground. Put another way, a sentence does not become common
ground until the Issue it has raised has been resolved. The upshot is that objective
sentences, but not subjective sentences, resolve the Issues they raise by default,
therefore explaining the asymmetry observed in §3.1.
5.3 No provocation of conversational crisis for subjective assertions
Above we saw how our account deals with agreement responses to subjective
assertions. In this section we turn to disagreement responses. First, note that default
agreement with ⟦S⟧sp is not called off by an addressee who responds with ¬S:
(18) A: This coffee is delicious.
B: No it isn’t!
B here does not dispute that A finds the coffee delicious; rather, they forcefully
express that they do not share that judgment. Our proposal predicts this fact, because
here B commits to ⟦¬S⟧B, which is not incompatible with a commitment to ⟦S⟧A,
and so does not block the acquisition of that commitment via default agreement. If
B wishes to avoid taking on a commitment to ⟦S⟧A via default agreement, they must
push back directly against that commitment:
(19) A: This coffee is delicious:
B: You don’t actually think that! That has to be a joke!
Responding to an assertion using the sentence S with a counter-assertion using the
sentence ¬S doesn’t block default agreement because the commitments don’t clash.
However, it does provoke conversational crisis, because it renders the Issue at hand
unresolvable. We argue that it’s exactly this asymmetry that explains Beltrama’s
observations.
Recall the definition of conversational crisis in (15). By this definition, a con-
versation is in crisis if there are no worlds compatible with all interlocutors’ com-
mitments that are also compatible with the denotation on the Table. In the case of
the disagreement in (18), A is committed to ⟦S⟧A, the proposition that A finds the
coffee delicious, and B is committed to ⟦¬S⟧B, the proposition that B doesn’t find
the coffee delicious. DEN(MAX(T )) is ⟦¬S⟧A+B, the proposition that both A and B
don’t find the coffee delicious. It should be obvious that there is no world compatible
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with both A and B’s commitments that is also compatible with what is on the Table.
Therefore, the conversation is in crisis.
However, recall also the definition of a severe conversational crisis in (16): a
conversational crisis is severe iff the participants cannot coherently share each others’
commitments. The disagreement in (18) does not provoke a severe conversational
crisis. Despite the fact that A and B will not be able to coordinate on a world in
which they have the same judgment of the coffee’s deliciousness, they are perfectly
able to agree to share each other’s commitments. A can remain committed to the
coffee being delicious in her judgment and also agree to share a commitment to the
coffee not being delicious in B’s judgment without contradicting themself—there
is a world at which both ⟦S⟧A and ⟦¬S⟧B are true; mutatis mutandis, the same goes
for B. We take the unseverity of conversational crises prompted by disagreements
over subjective sentences to explain Beltrama’s (2018a) observations that such
disagreements facilitate moves that welcome the other party’s opinion to a higher
degree than disagreements over objective sentences.
5.4 Asymmetric licensing of totally
Beltrama (2018b) analyzes totally as an epistemic operator conveying the speaker’s
belief that the proposition should be true in the judgment of all interlocutors. We
extend this analysis to the response particle use of totally as follows. First, we
assume the particle is always accompanied by a prejacent clause, which is usually
fully elided. Just as with the polarity particles yes and no (see discussion above), we
assume that what is asserted is the prejacent clause. On this view, totally serves to
add an additional speaker commitment on top of the commitment to the denotation
of the prejacent that follows from the operation of assertion.
(20) An assertion of a sentence of the form totally(S) asserts S, and additionally
commits the speaker to the proposition ∀i, i′(⟦p⟧i = ⟦p⟧i′)
In other words, a response with totally commits the responder to the prejacent
sentence having a judge-invariant denotation relative to a judge pool comprising the
set of current interlocutors.
In the case of objective sentences, of course, the sentence has a judge-invariant
denotation by definition. Therefore, the proposition that it is judge-invariant with
respect to the current set of interlocutors is intrinsically redundant. However, if the
sentence is subjective, then the proposition that it is judge-invariant with respect to
the current set of interlocutors is not intrinsically redundant. We suggest that the
intrinsic redundancy of this additional commitment, which is the sole contribution
of totally, explains why totally is degraded in response to objective sentences.
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6 Beyond judge dependence: An internalist sketch
In the above, we’ve used a judge-dependent framework for the sake of simplicity
and formal clarity. We take the above to serve as a proof of concept that the observed
asymmetries can be derived from a unified account of the context update operation
carried out by assertions. However, it’s not necessary to adopt a judge-dependent
semantics in order to deliver this result. In this section, we sketch an approach
to explaining these asymmetries that doesn’t rely on any formal distinction at all
between the content of subjective and objective sentences.
The motivation for a semantic distinction between subjective and objective
predicates starts from externalist assumptions. Given an externalist view of denotata
(Putnam 1973), the denotation of a predicate is a set of entities that exist in the
world, and there is an objective fact of the matter about whether any entity is a
member of that denotation or not. Thus, if faultless disagreement is possible, the
denotation of a subjective predicate must be something other than the ordinary,
judge-invariant set of entities. It’s not clear that this problem motivates a semantic
distinction between subjective and objective predicates if one makes internalist
assumptions about denotata (Chomsky 2003). If whether or not an entity is a
member of a predicate is simply a fact about some agent’s mental representation of
the world, we could take an entirely different approach to the ramifications of these
classic observations. In this section, we outline an internalist approach to subjective
predicates, and describe how it might account for some aspects of their discourse
behavior. For the purposes of this paper, this will remain only a sketch.
6.1 Internalism and subjective predicates
We now outline our basic assumptions about an internalist interpretation of model-
theoretic semantics. We assume a standard version of model-theoretic predicate
logic, in which one-place predicates simply denote sets of entities. A model repre-
sents some agent’s mental representation of the world they inhabit. When we judge
sentences to be true or false, we make those judgments by evaluating them against
our own models. When we refer to the EXTENSION of a predicate in some model,
we refer to the set of mental representations of entities denoted by that predicate in
that model, rather than to any set of actual physical objects that exist in reality.
By hypothesis, when one knows the meaning of a predicate-denoting expression,
one knows on what basis one can conclude that an entity belongs in the extension of
that predicate in one’s own model. An agent is justified in concluding that an entity
belongs in the extension of a predicate iff they have access to a piece of PREDICATE-
RELEVANT EVIDENCE (e). Evidence is predicate-relevant if the observation of it
settles whether or not an entity is a member of that predicate. An e is generated by
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applying a VALID MEASURING APPARATUS (vma) to an entity. A speaker knows
the meaning of a predicate if they know what its vmas are, and what its es are.
To make this concrete, let’s consider two predicates, the objective less-then-four-
feet-wide, and the subjective tasty. Throughout, we’ll use these two predicates as
proxies for the class of objective predicates and the class of subjective predicates, at
the risk of over-generalizing. For less-than-four-feet-wide, a vma is a tape measure.
The e generated by applying a vma to an entity is a length. Iff e is less than four
feet, that entity is a member of the predicate in the mental model of an agent who
has access to e. For tasty, a vma is a set of tastebuds. The e generated by applying a
vma to an entity is an experience falling somewhere along the spectrum of pleasure,
indifference, and displeasure. Iff e is a pleasurable experience, that entity is a
member of the predicate in the mental model of an agent who has access to e.
On this view, there is no formal difference between objective and subjective
predicates—they both denote sets of entities in mental models. If an agent eats a
hot dog and has a sensory response of the correct kind, they have applied a vma to
the hot dog and generated an e that places the hot dog in the extension of tasty in
their mental model, just as if they measure a door with a tape measure and find that
its length is three feet, they have applied a vma to the door and generated an e that
places the door in the extension of less-than-four-feet-wide. The difference between
the two classes of predicates is in terms of what kind of evidence an agent will make
use of in deciding how to populate the properties in their mental model with entities.
By virtue of the kind of evidence used to justify the inclusion of an entity in
an objective predicate like less-than-four-feet-wide, any competent observer who
has applied a vma to a door will generate the same e, settling the question of its
membership in the predicate.15 If two agents disagree, it must be either that at least
one of them is not competent (e.g. has misread their vma), or has not used a vma
(e.g. their tape measure is inaccurate). That is to say, there is very high INTER-
ANNOTATOR AGREEMENT (IA) about predicates like less-than-four-feet-wide.
However, it is simply not the case that any competent observer who has applied
a vma to a hot dog will generate the same e regarding its tastiness. Two competent
observers can apply a vma (i.e. their taste buds) to the same hot dog and observe two
distinct es: a pleasant experience and an unpleasant one. That is to say there is very
low IA about predicates like tasty. This isn’t a fact about formal semantics—it’s part
of our world-knowledge. Perhaps it’s all and only those predicates that display low
IA that display the kinds of “subjective” behavior at issue in this paper. Call the
hypothesis that low IA in itself is responsible for the interesting behavior of sub-
jective predicates the INTER-ANNOTATOR AGREEMENT THEORY OF SUBJECTIVE
PREDICATES (IAT).





If the denotations of subjective predicates are no different than the denotations
of predicates of any other kind, then asserting a subjective sentence should be no
different than asserting an objective one, and likewise for disagreement. If there is
no formal difference between assertion of subjective and objective sentences, then
whence the intuition that one kind of disagreement is faultless and the other isn’t?
Call a disagreement faulty if some party is not a competent observer, or has not
used a vma. If two people disagree about the extension of an objective predicate
within their respective mental models, somebody must be at fault, by virtue of the
high IA of objective predicates: any two competent observers who have applied
a vma to an entity will generate the same e. But if two people disagree about
the extension of a subjective predicate within their respective mental models, it’s
possible that both are competent observers who have applied a vma, and simply
observed different es, by virtue of the low IA of subjective predicates. Hence the
possibility of a faultless interpretation of the disagreement.
IAT makes predictions about when disagreement over subjective predicates
should not be interpreted as faultless. Sometimes there is very high IA about
the (non)membership of certain kinds of entities in the extensions of subjective
predicates. Hazel Pearson (2013) observes the following sentence:
(21) Soapy dishwater is tasty. (ex. 83a)
Pearson expresses the intuition that this is “just plain false.” I.e. disagreement over
it is not faultless. Given IAT, this is because there is extremely high IA about the
tastiness of soapy dishwater, and so we’re not willing to believe that a competent
observer could apply their taste buds to it and have a pleasurable experience. IAT
predicts (accurately, it seems) that faultless disagreement is a property of predicate-
argument pairs, not predicates simpliciter, and that the distribution of plausible
judgments influences intuitions about the faultyness of a disagreement. Note also
that IAT views faultlessness as arising from the assumption that both parties are com-
petent observers who’ve used vmas. In contexts that don’t license this assumption,
faultlessness is less available. Imagine an argument between a master sommelier and
a layperson about whether a particular Cabernet is delicious. A wine snob might be
unwilling to say this is faultless—the layperson’s untrained palette simply doesn’t,
in their judgment, qualify as a vma in comparison to the master sommelier’s.
6.3 Default agreement and the acquaintance inference
An utterance of (22a) is associated with an inference that the speaker has tasted a
Big Mac. An utterance of (22b) is not associated with an inference that the speaker
has measured a Big Mac.
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(22) a. Big Macs are tasty.
b. Big Macs are four inches wide.
(22a), but not (22b), displays the ACQUAINTANCE INFERENCE (Ninan 2014; Kaiser
& Herron Lee 2017; Anand & Korotkova 2018; Muñoz 2019). The IAT predicts
both this inference and asymmetries in default agreement in the same stroke. If you
believe that a competent observer has used a vma to generate an e that places an
entity in the extension of an objective predicate in their own model, you’re justified
in believing that entity to be a member of that extension yourself, though you don’t
actually have access to e. This is because you can be confident that you’d generate
the same e if you used a vma, by virtue of the high IA of the predicate. But even if
you believe that a competent observer has used a vma to generate an e that places an
entity in a subjective predicate in their own model, you’re not justified in believing
that entity to be a member of that predicate yourself. You can’t be confident that
you’d generate the same e if you used a vma, by virtue of the low IA of the predicate.
In other words, for objective predicates, the observation that an agent has legiti-
mately generated an e that places an entity in a predicate in their mental model itself
counts as an e that justifies placement of that entity in that predicate in other agents’
mental models. For predicates that display low IA, the same observation does not
count as such a piece of evidence. This is the default agreement asymmetry: if we
assume our interlocutor to be sincere and competent, our willingness to adopt their
judgments about objective (but not subjective) predicates follows. And if an agent
is justified in asserting that an entity is a member of a subjective predicate—i.e., if
they have access to an e that places it in the predicate—it must be that they are “ac-
quainted” with it in the relevant way, because e is a mind-internal sensory response,
and cannot be reliably inferred on the basis of other observers’ conclusions.
7 Conclusion
We find this final sketch attractive because it connects the behavior of subjective
predicates to the kind of evidence on the basis of which one can conclude that an
entity is a member of that predicate (Rudolph 2018). Is it a kind of evidence about
which there is strong inter-annotator agreement, like a measurement of length? Or is
it a kind of evidence for which there is low inter-annotator agreement, like a sense
of enjoyment that accompanies the consumption of food? Connecting the behavior
of subjective predicates to the kind of evidence relevant to them allows us to make
predictions about which predicates will be the subjective ones. This advantage is not
shared by judge dependent accounts, which must simply stipulate which predicates
are sensitive to the judge parameter, and thereby make no predictions about which
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